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This dissertation offers a study of the parliamentary power of investigation in a com-
parative perspective. A parliamentary investigation, as defined here, is an inquiry 
carried out by a parliamentary committee provided with investigative jurisdiction 
and accompanying powers by its parent chamber, to which the committee is also 
expected to report. 
The Dutch parliament’s power of investigation (or inquiry) was first recognized 
in the Constitution of 1848. A Parliamentary Inquiries Act was adopted in 1850. The 
PIA, as amended, provides both chambers with the power to create a temporary in-
vestigatory committee with special statutory powers such as the right to summon 
witnesses to provide oral or written evidence. After a promising start in the nine-
teenth century, in which it was applied mainly as an instrument for large legislative 
projects, the instrument was largely abandoned for most of the twentieth century. In 
the late 1970s, however, increasing parliamentary activism led the Dutch House of 
Representatives – the politically dominant chamber – to revive its investigative pow-
er. Since then, the House has adopted more than thirty motions to launch a parlia-
mentary investigation. These investigations are carried out by specially created 
temporary committees of the House and mainly serves as a tool for in-depth parlia-
mentary scrutiny of the government. Only nine of these modern investigations were 
carried out by statutory committees established under the PIA 
(‘enquêtecommissies’). The others were ‘regular’ investigations carried out by tem-
porary committees without special statutory powers. In 2012, the Dutch Senate used 
its investigatory power for the first time in history by establishing a temporary (non-
statutory) committee of investigation. 
Since its revival, the power of investigation is generally considered a successful 
innovation in parliamentary practice. In the light of the ongoing debate about par-
liament’s ability to perform its constitutional functions, especially its duty to scruti-
nize the policies and actions of the government, members as well as observers of 
parliament have called for the further development of the investigative function. 
Through investigations, it is argued, parliament can improve its institutional 
knowledge base, which is essential to maintaining an independent position vis-à-vis 
the government. Against this background, this dissertation focuses on the law and 
practice of parliamentary investigations in three systems: the Netherlands, the Unit-
ed Kingdom and the United States. Through a comparative analysis, it aims to pro-
vide insights, ideas and recommendations for the Dutch parliament’s investigative 
function. To acquire a good understanding of the way in which the investigative 
power is applied in each system, the subject is studied from a broad perspective. 
Thus, it includes all forms of investigations carried out by parliamentary committees, 
statutory and non-statutory, and focuses not only on constitutional or legal aspects 
but also on organizational and practical matters. 
In each country report, the discussion is divided in four chapters. The first chap-
ter provides an analysis of the constitutional background of the parliament’s power 
to investigate, including the political context in which it functions. Key constitutional 
concepts, such as ministerial accountability, parliament’s controlling or scrutinizing 
role, existing parliamentary instruments, as well as important elements in the politi-
cal context, such as the party system, are discussed. In the second chapter, the specif-
ic powers associated with parliamentary investigations, such as the right to summon 
witnesses and to gather written evidence, are discussed. This chapter also focuses on 
the special constitutional position of ministers and civil servants – or, in the Ameri-
can context: the President and the executive branch – in the context of parliamentary 
investigations. The third chapter discusses the committee structure, support organi-
zations and other organizational aspects. The fourth chapter focuses on the investiga-
tive process, including issues such as confidentiality of evidence and the concurrence 
of parliamentary and criminal investigations.  
In the final part of this dissertation, the key findings in the country reports for 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States are compared and con-
trasted. What has become clear is that the history of power of investigation in all 
three systems goes back to the early beginnings of each parliament. For a long time, 
these parliaments applied their investigative power incidentally and for various pur-
poses. In the twentieth century, however, the face of parliamentary investigations 
began to change. With the development of the welfare state came a growing gov-
ernment bureaucracy. In their efforts to keep pace, members of parliament realized 
that in order to exercise parliamentary control (congressional oversight in American 
terminology) effectively, acquiring adequate knowledge and expertise were of the 
essence. In each system, parliamentary (or congressional) reforms included strength-
ening the investigative function. In the United States Congress, the Legislative Re-
form Act of 1946 restructured the system of standing committees in both chambers, 
requiring them to exercise continuous watchfulness over executive departments and 
agencies within their jurisdiction. In the British House of Commons, a system of de-
partmental select committees was created in 1979 in order to examine the expendi-
ture, administration and policy of the principle government departments and 
associated public bodies. In both systems, the power of investigation was delegated 
to these permanent committees to be used at their discretion in the exercise of their 
functions. The House and Senate standing committees in the United States were pro-
vided with the right to subpoena witnesses for oral or written testimony, while the 
British select committees were granted the traditional parliamentary powers to send 
for persons, papers and records. These committees, established for a full parliamen-
tary or congressional term, cover a broad policy area – roughly mirroring the struc-
ture of the executive branch – and can initiate investigations at their own accord, 
allowing them to set their own research agenda. In the Netherlands, by contrast, the 
investigative power, rediscovered in the 1970s primarily as an instrument for parlia-
mentary scrutiny, has always remained a power to be incidentally delegated by the 
House of Representatives to temporary statutory or non-statutory committees. Dutch 
investigative committees are created for a specific inquiry, work within a detailed 
research framework as determined by the House and are dissolved after the report 
has been published and debated. Such temporary committees have become excep-
tional in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
While the British and American committee systems share some basic character-
istics, a closer look at the way in which these committees operate also reveals a num-
ber of key differences. The British select committee system was introduced as a new 
institutional framework to complement the traditional instruments for parliamentary 
scrutiny of government, mainly exercised in the politically strongly divided and an-
tagonistic chamber. In order to stimulate independence, coherence and cooperation 
within committees, the new committees are relatively small and membership is re-
stricted to backbenchers, i.e. members who do not fulfill prominent party-political 
functions within parliament such as (shadow) ministers and (opposition) whips. 
House and Senate committees in the United States are generally much larger and 
have significant legislative and budgetary powers next to their oversight responsi-
bilities, making committees important forums for political decision making within 
Congress. Allocation of seats within committees generally reflects the broader party 
balance within the chamber, but unlike the more consensual British select commit-
tees, the majority party often determines the committee’s investigative agenda, even 
though the minority is procedurally entitled to a minimum of investigative rights. 
Especially in times of divided government, committee oversight and investigations 
can be highly partisan, although congressional committee practice also harbors a 
tradition of cross-party cooperation. Such cooperation is mainly to be seen at the lev-
el of oversight subcommittees working in low-politics areas, where majority and mi-
nority leaders find common interests and maintain good personal relationships. The 
Dutch temporary committees do not reflect the political power balance in the multi-
party chamber. Instead, it has become customary for each party group within the 
House to detach one of their members to serve on the committee. Unlike standing 
committees, in which political differences and coalition or opposition positions are 
articulated, investigative committees in the Dutch parliament are usually character-
ized by interparty cooperation and consensus building across the political spectrum.  
The analysis of the three systems has shown that power of investigation has 
been significantly more institutionalized in the British House of Commons and the 
American Congress, albeit in different ways, than in the Dutch House of Representa-
tives. Even though the number of parliamentary investigations in the Netherlands 
has grown over the past decades, their appearance in everyday parliamentary prac-
tice has remained incidental. On the basis of experiences in the British and American 
systems, it is argued in the final chapter of this book that the investigative function of 
the Dutch parliament should be further developed. There are several reasons for do-
ing so. First, delegating the investigative power to permanent committees can con-
tribute to parliament’s efforts to reduce the current imbalance of power between 
government and parliament. Permanent investigative committees, supported by a 
small but professional committee staff and possibly a central research facility within 
the House, can improve parliament’s institutional ability to process and analyze the 
ever growing amount of information that is made available by government depart-
ments and other sources. Such committees, unlike the existing standing committees 
in the House, would be well-suited to improve parliament’s institutional memory. 
Second, as the British example shows, permanent investigative committees could 
play a useful role in parliament’s function as forum for ministerial accountability. 
The accountability process can become more substantial than in the chamber or the 
standing committees, because investigative committees proceed on the basis of evi-
dence rather than political debate. Moreover, in a less politically divisive environ-
ment the accountability process can more easily accommodate other actors such as 
departmental civil servants and officials from independent government agencies. 
Even though in the constitutional context of ministerial accountability in both the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands departmental civil servants are normally ex-
pected to act upon the instructions of their ministers, the British case has demonstrat-
ed that this does not have to prevent ministers from allowing their civil servants to 
provide evidence to investigative committees. Third, the investigative process can 
serve as a way to make parliament more accessible, as it allows for outside partici-
pants such as interest groups and community organizations to share their opinions, 
experiences and expertise and actively participate in the evaluation of government 
policies. The investigative process is most useful in this respect when it is organized 
in a more or less standardized, predictable and transparent way. In addition, com-
mittees should actively seek the participation of outsiders, especially from groups or 
individuals who might not otherwise find their way to parliament. The British com-
mittees have been more successful in this respect than their Dutch and American 
counterparts.  
When elaborating initiatives to further develop the investigative function of the 
Dutch parliament on the basis of experiences in other systems, one obviously needs 
to take into account the specific characteristics of the Dutch system. From a constitu-
tional perspective, the power of investigation is sufficiently broad to allow for new 
initiatives. The government is required to cooperate with investigative committees in 
parliament, for example by providing documents and other forms of evidence upon 
request, although the ‘interest of the state’, a fairly undefined concept, prevents the 
(unconditional) provision of certain information. In organizational terms, the Dutch 
House of Representatives is much smaller than the British and American parlia-
ments, while the multi-party system has resulted in an ideologically much more 
fragmented political landscape. This makes the overall number of members available 
for investigative committees much smaller in the Dutch parliament than in the other 
systems. Therefore, if the predominant and often celebrated culture of building cross-
party consensus is to be preserved within Dutch investigative committees and the 
constructive cooperation of the government is considered essential, then further de-
veloping the investigative function is most likely to succeed if one primarily stimu-
lates investigations regarding topics which are not at the heart of party-political 
debate and in which the position of individual ministers is not directly at stake.  
Taking into account the specific conditions as noted above, the book argues that 
strengthening parliament’s investigative function can take several directions. One 
direction is to further stimulate coordinating initiatives already taking place, such as 
the new research agenda procedure. This initiative provides, in addition to the tradi-
tion of ad hoc inquiries into specific policy shortcomings or incidents which have 
caused public concern, for a decision making process to establish a limited number of 
small-scale parliamentary investigations annually focusing broadly on the imple-
mentation of policy and future challenges. Topics are selected on the basis of pro-
posals brought forward by members in the standing committees. The agenda initia-
tive, however, remains a centralized form of parliamentary decision making and the 
investigations included in the annual agenda are again carried out by temporary 
investigative committees. In both political and practical terms, further developing the 
investigative function along this path has its limits. In the spirit of the American and 
especially the British system, a more promising direction would be, it is argued, to 
decentralize the investigative function and to examine possibilities to create perma-
nent committees with a continuous and flexible investigative mandate. In that light, 
the book concludes with a detailed proposal for the introduction of a system of per-
manent investigative subcommittees within the current standing committees. Such a 
reform requires no constitutional or statutory action and can be easily implemented 
by amending the House Rules. These subcommittees should be instructed to carry 
out investigations on topics of their own choosing with the jurisdiction of their par-
ent committee, preferably focusing on broad forms of policy evaluation that stimu-
late a constructive (but not uncritical) dialogue with ministers and civil servants and 
allow for the participation of others. To stimulate internal coherence, subcommittee 
members should preferably not fulfill party-political positions within the commit-
tee’s jurisdiction. Providing these subcommittees with statutory investigative powers 
under the Parliamentary Inquiries Act seems unnecessary, but if circumstances so 
require, the Act does not prevent the House to temporarily delegate such powers. 
Rather than providing formal powers, however, what is essential is for these sub-
committees to be provided with a small but professional support staff and to actively 
seek cooperation with independent expert bodies such as auditing, planning and 
advising institutions.  
The proposed institutional reform would be an addition to, rather than a re-
placement of, the existing practice of establishing temporary statutory or non-
statutory committees for specific inquiries, even though for practical reasons such 
investigations will likely become more exceptional. The existing legislative and pro-
cedural framework for ad hoc parliamentary investigations, which underwent a com-
prehensive modernization in 2008, should therefore be maintained, although on the 
basis of recent practice as well as comparative insights, some recommendations for 
improvement are formulated, for example with respect to the protection of witnesses, 
the position of the committee chair, and the rules regarding the archiving of evidence 
and other committee documents. 
 
